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It is scarcely becoming for the authors of a
recently published book to air a full-scale reply to
a review, however critical. Nor have we done so
here. Professor Leys, a notable political scientist,
has identified a number of weaknesses in our
attempts in Redistribution with Growth to inte-
grate the politics of distribution with its economic
analysis, and in so doing, he makes several points
with which we do not take issue. The following
comments are aimed at directing attention back
to RwG itself, which many readers of the Bulletin
will not yet have had a chance to study.
First, Leys claims that RwG contains "a .
distinct assumption that social revolution ought
to be avoided". As evidence for this charge Leys
does not produce any explicit statement to this
effectthere are nonebut it is instructive to
consider the highly selective quotations he does
provide.
In the discussion on land reform in chapter 3,
the passage he cites from page 61 of RwG (see
page 4 of this Bulletin) is cheek by jowl with a
sketch of a very different, and not implausible,
outcome of an initially timid attempt at reform
from above:
'A sort of 'landgrab' epidemic may result,
accompanied by a good deal of dislocation and
perhaps violence . . . . the ensuing upheaval
would threaten revolution in towns and call
private rights to property into question more
generally" (p. 60).
The position taken on land reform is best reflec-
ted in the following unambiguous statement: "We
consider . . . . land reform to be a necessary
condition for the type of strategy propounded in
this volume . . .
." (p. 119).
Nor can the book be accused of naive reformist
optimism. The conclusions of chapter 3, which
Leys considers to be a fair summary of the text,
include the following:
"There are a number of regimes for which the
strategy proposed in this volume is 'out of
court'. Some are dominated by entrenched elites
who will relinquish nothing to the under-
privileged except under the duress of armed
force. Others have attacked successfully the
causes of poverty by means far more direct and
radical than those discussed here" (p. 71).
Do these sentiments reflect a preoccupation with
preserving the existing fabric of society?
Secondly, there is the question of whether the
use of the target group concept entails the rejec-
tion of class. Leys would probably accept the
distinction between a group being a class in itself
as apposed to a class for itself, a distinction which
rests primarily on the group's state of conscious-
ness and organization. If, in a particular situation
the poor are apathetic and politically fragmented
(a number of classes in themselves), the term
target group provides a simple and convenient
categorization for (admittedly reformist) policy. It
does not follow that the poor are then to be
treated as the passive objects of policy, nor does
RwG argue as much. Indeed, there are a number
of references in chapter 3 to the connection
between poverty and the consciousness and organ-
ization of those who suffer it, the context of an
RwG strategy included. As for 'trade unions' of
the poor, Leys is quite correct in pointing out
that sponsorship from above can serve as a
powerful instrument of manipulation. However,
to take a specific example, it is worth noting that
unions of the landless and tenants have made,
and subsequently defended, important gains in
Kerala over almost a decade, and within a politi-
cal framework which is reformist at best. Perhaps
RwG is too sanguine and 'liberal' about the con-
sequence of official sponsorship; in many coun-
tries, the poor would be happy enough to organize
themselves without interference.
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Thirdly, Leys makes some unwarranted inferences
concerning the political import of the weighted
index calculations of growth of welfare. As
chapter 2 makes clear:
"(These) are essentially 'illustrative' to show the
potential usefulness of weighted growth indexes
in evaluating performance. They are not pre-
sented as definitive assessments of country
experience" (p. 41).
The text posits a 'poverty' set of weights 0.6, 0.3,
0.1 for the lowest 40 per cent, middle 40 per cent
and top 20 per cent, respectively, which should be
compared with typical weights implicit in GNP
growth rates of 0.1, 0.35, 0.55 respectively. How
this restructuring can be construed as a political
programme of backing small capitalists (who
belong mostly to the top 20 per cent anyway) is
rather puzzling The weighting scheme is perfectly
applicable even if we take the stronger view that
only the bottom 40 per cent should count. The
weights are then 1, 0, 0, (which simplifies the
arithmetic) and the illustrative results can be
read off directly from the third column of table
11.1 (p. 42). That this variant was not elaborated
in the text had nothing to do with the alleged
desire to legitimize an (alternative) political pro-
gramme; it seemed, at the time, too obvious :o
merit çommentáry.
The fourth and final point is in many respects the
most important, though Leys confines himself
to a statement of position with little prior discus-
sion. It is this: does the acceptance of RwG's
perspective necessarily entail a general pro-
gramme directed against radical change? It has
been argued above that RwG most certainly does
not assume that radical change ought to be
avoided. Having disposed of intentions, the issue
is reduced to the effects of an attempted RwG
strategy within a reformist setting on the prospects
for more profound structural changes.
Whether or not reformist policies will stave off,
or promote, a social revolution is a question to
which there is no general answer. Pointing, quite
correctly, to the inconclusiveness of much of the
argument in chapter 3, Leys moves on to the need
for analysis which is rooted in particular histori-
cal and geographical circumstances. Quite so; the
same applies to the impact of reformist policies.
Certainly, there is no overwhelming historical
evidence that palliative measures delayed or
averted revolutions. If anything, experience
suggests that, following a long period of repres-
sion, the opposite is true. Strong divergences of
view among the Left on questions of strategy and
tactics reflect the difficulties inherent in this
question. For example, Lenin argued forcefully
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that Stolypin's agrarian reforms were capable of
defusing the situation in Russia, whereas some
modern radical scholars, discussing a different
historical situation, believe that such reforms will
destabilize the existing order.
Professor Leys does not take an explicit stand
on this difficult question, and we do not wish to
impute to him the position that reformist policies
are always reactionary in an historical sense.
Equally, it would be absurd to claim that the
opposite is generally true. Given the present
sufferings of the poor and the uncertain prospects
for political change over the next generation or
more, the case for erring on the side of alleviating
poverty now in a reformist setting is not easily
dismissed, especially if it does not preclude the
possibility of other solutions.
In summary, we reject the idea that nothing can
be done about poverty in a reformist context.
The available evidence does not support the
hypothesis that the material conditions of the
poor have been improved in only one type of
society, whether socialist or capitalist, nor that
those in power in capitalist countries always resist
efforts to do so.
On the contrary, from the evidence available for
a number of societies, it appears that policies of
poverty alleviation can be envisioned in a variety
of situations. Our main concern has been to
provide an economic framework within which
policy makers in countries that are disposed to
do so can take more effective action to raise the
incomes and welfare of the poor.
